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The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 amended the Public Order Act 1986 to 
create new stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales, making it an 
offence, amongst other things, to use threatening words or behaviour or publish 
threatening words or distribute threatening materials, recordings or videos with the 
intention of stirring up hatred against people on grounds of their religion, albeit with a 
freedom of expression proviso protecting discussion, criticism and ridicule of 
religious beliefs and practices.1 But what was and is the real function of the new 
stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales from the perspective of 
government, parliamentarians and the judiciary?  
This question has already attracted some attention from legal scholars, and the 
most common conjecture is that the real driving force behind the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 was for the Labour government to provide a sop to Muslims: to take 
with one hand from British Muslims, in the shape of draconian anti-terrorism laws, 
but give back with the other, in the form of protection against the stirring up of 
religious hated.2 Yet there has also been a lack of systematic, historical analysis of the 
question: both in terms of testing the validity of the sop explanation and in terms of 
identifying and assessing rival explanations. This article is in some small way an 
attempt to put that right. I am partly engaged, therefore, in a critique of the 
explanations found in the existing literature on this subject, but also partly concerned 
with evaluating potential explanations identified for the purposes of this inquiry. 
Why does an inquiry into events of more than a decade ago matter? I believe that 
it is inherently important to try to understand something of the politics behind the 
introduction of the new offences as an exercise in political history. But no doubt this 
investigation has other potentially significant implications, including gaining a better 
understanding of the true scope of anti-terrorism policy agendas in England and 
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Wales, re-evaluating the nature of the New Labour project, uncovering 
inconsistencies in the Prevent strategy, shedding light on the political position of the 
Muslim community in England and Wales, or even testing general theories of public 
policy and the dynamics of legislative change. However, my own particular interest is 
in teasing out how the best explanation of the true purpose behind the stirring up 
religious hatred offences bears on the many normative arguments that have been made 
about the rights and wrongs of these laws, including arguments about further 
extensions covering transgender identity and disability. I shall argue that although it 
might be perfectly possible to normatively evaluate these laws without understanding 
the real functions they were and are supposed to serve, it is much harder to do so in 
ways that stand a decent chance of impacting future governmental, parliamentary and 
judicial decisions. 
This article tries to explain the politics behind the introduction of the new stirring 
up religious hatred offences by examining not only the justifications provided by 
elected politicians, government ministers and peers at the time but also the wider 
context of legislation and the political environment, including the strategic aims of the 
Labour Party as set against the de facto power of members of the House of Lords to 
slow the passage of legislation, and also how the legislation has actually been used in 
practice by courts in England and Wales. In casting the evidential net so widely I do 
not mean to ignore or blur the distinction between the point of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006 as seen from the government’s perspective, parliament’s 
perspective and a judicial perspective. Clearly such perspectives can, and often do, 
come apart. So where I do draw on evidence from post-enactment events (court 
decisions, political speeches made later on), I do so only in highly qualified ways. 
Nevertheless, one general point worth emphasising here is that since any public 
policy, including public policy on hate speech, is constituted not only by legislative 
acts that implement the will of the government but also by constitutional protections 
embedded in the principles of parliamentary supremacy and by judicial decisions 
applying those legislative acts to the circumstances of actual cases, it would be 
impossible to fully understand the politics behind the introduction of the stirring up 
religious hatred offences without knowing something of the perspectives of 
government, parliamentarians and the judiciary. Indeed, it is also important to note 
that under s. 29L of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 it is the Attorney 
General, a position appointed by the sovereign on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
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who must approve all prosecutions, and this fact alone inevitably brings some of the 
government’s intent into the courtroom. In other words, my aim is not merely to 
explain the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 but also to explain the broader and 
ongoing public policy on incitement to hatred in England and Wales. 
 Drawing on this evidence I identify five possible accounts of the real function of, 
and true explanation for, the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred 
offences. One of these accounts (the sop explanation) has already gained traction 
among academics as well as among some journalists and social commentators, but I 
seek to see how far it, along with alternative rival accounts, can be substantiated based 
on the available evidence. First, the public order explanation is that the government 
introduced laws banning the stirring up of religious hatred in response to mass 
disturbances and riots that had taken on more complex racial, ethnic and religious 
dimensions since the Race Relations Act 1965. Second, the sop explanation is that the 
government only developed a serious interest in the problem of the stirring up of 
religious hatred after the 9/11 twin towers attack in 2001 and the 7/7 London 
bombings in 2005 respectively, and only legislated new stirring up religious hatred 
offences as a way of sweetening the pill of anti-terrorism legislation for the Muslim 
community affected by it. Third, the anti-terrorism explanation puts the existence of 
the new stirring up religious hatred offences squarely down to the fight against 
Islamist terrorism, and security concerns over the potential for further atrocities like 
9/11 and 7/7 off the back of radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists 
stirring up religious as well as racial hatred. Fourth, the client politics explanation 
shifts the focus from Muslims as stirring up religious hatred to Muslims as the victims 
of the stirring up of religious hatred; the idea being that a concentration of the burden 
of hate speech on Muslims produced a highly motivated, mobilised and persuasive 
lobbying group. Fifth, the parity of protection explanation points to the more basic 
point that, due to the way legal authorities defined ‘race’, Muslims did not enjoy legal 
protection against the stirring up of racial hatred at a time when other groups that also 
partly identified themselves in religious terms, namely, Jews and Sikhs, did enjoy 
such protection. 
 In what follows I present and critically evaluate each of the aforementioned 
explanations in turn. In the end I come down on the side of a pluralistic approach, one 
that combines the public order explanation with the client politics explanation in 
conjunction with the parity of protection explanation, whilst deemphasising the sop 
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explanation and the anti-terrorism explanation. Finally, I try to spell out some 
implications of this largely historical analysis for how legal scholars today argue 
about and seek to normatively reject or defend incitement to hatred laws and the 
extension thereof to new categories of people. 
 Before I begin, however, I also want to make the crucial methodological point 
that when it comes to the interpretation of events dating back over a decade we are 
certainly not in the terrain of incontrovertible evidence. That is why I shall not say 
that the public policy on incitement to religious hatred we have in England and Wales 
cannot possibly have the chief purpose that a given explanation claims for it based on 
the available evidence. It is more a matter of sifting through the evidence and taking it 
as a whole. There are no smoking guns here, merely a balance of probabilities. 
 
 
The public order explanation 
 
The public order explanation draws strength from the history surrounding the 
introduction of the racial hatred offences. Following the end of the Second World War 
Britain saw a significant increase in immigration from the West Indies, India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. This was partly Britain’s recognition of the role played by 
the Commonwealth in the war effort, partly Britain’s post-colonial settlement, and 
partly a response to the need for labour in building British infrastructure and public 
services. By 1958, however, some parts of Britain, most notably Notting Hill in 
London, were the scene of racial violence and riots between whites and West Indian 
blacks. Latent tensions were sparked when a white Swedish woman who was married 
to a West Indian man was assaulted by a group of white men. These events fed into a 
larger national conversation about race relations in Britain. It was a conversation that 
would go on to encompass Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘rivers of blood’ speech in the 
summer of 1968, in which he issued dark warnings about threats to public order if 
questions of immigration and integration were not satisfactorily resolved. 
 Against this backdrop, the Race Relations Act 1965 sought to provide a 
framework of fair expectations between divided sections of British society, and 
included the introduction of new stirring up racial hatred offences. At the time several 
parliamentarians suggested the idea of incorporating religion as well as racial hatred 
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within the scope of the offences, but Dingle Mackintosh Foot, then Solicitor-General, 
rejected the idea. He claimed that it would be undesirable on free speech grounds. 
 
Both the tenets and the practices of various religious denominations are the 
subject of violent differences and of perfectly legitimate controversy. There is 
all the difference in the world between attacking a section of the public 
because of the colour of their skins and attacking them because, say, they 
subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles.3 
 
He also claimed that it would be unnecessary. 
 
I agree − we all agree − that nothing is more loathsome and more 
contemptible than expressions of anti-Semitism. But those expressions are 
not, at any rate in 99 cases out of 100, based on theological considerations. 
When there are attacks upon the Jews […] they are not directed merely 
against those who observe the Mosaic law. They are directed against Jews as 
a race.4 
 
In fact, the idea of including religion within the scope of the stirring up hatred 
offences never disappeared entirely from parliamentary debates on issues of race 
relations for the next two decades.5 But the idea continuously butted up against the 
sorts of objections articulated above by Dingle Mackintosh Foot.  
In the meantime, Britain continued to see mass disturbances and riots. In 1995, a 
district of Bradford, West Yorkshire, was the scene of three days of rioting, including 
violence between the police and South Asian residents. Then again, in 2001 both 
Bradford and Burnley saw conflict between the city’s British Asian population and its 
white British residents, fuelled by the activities of far right groups including the 
British National Party and the National Front. In 2005, in Birmingham, there was 
conflict between people with Afro-Caribbean origins and people of South Asian 
descent, triggered by unsubstantiated allegations of the gang rape of a black teenage 
girl by a group of South Asian men. What had previously been public disorder based 
on racial tensions and rooted in economic deprivation, now took on complex racial, 
ethnic and religious dimensions, relating not merely to poverty but also in some 
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instances to minority religious identities (Muslim, Sikh, Hindu) that people felt they 
needed to assert. 
During this period the Labour government made a series of attempts to introduce 
new legislation making it an offence also to stir up hatred on grounds of religion. It 
tried unsuccessfully via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 and the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004, introduced by Jack Straw’s 
successor as Home Secretary, David Blunkett. Then it succeeded via the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Bill in 2005 and, ultimately, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006, introduced by David Blunkett’s successor as Home Secretary, Charles Clarke. 
According to the public order explanation, the introduction of the legislation was a 
direct response to, and triggered by, the fact that mass disturbances and riots were not 
going away and were becoming increasingly more complex, meaning religion could 
no longer be left out of the equation in understanding them. Moreover, the inclusion 
of the stirring up religious hatred offences within the Public Order Act 1986 was not 
mere convenience but went to the heart of the real function of the offences. 
From the perspective of process tracing, it is difficult to argue with the timings of 
the various events described above, with the putative causes and effects in their 
correct temporal sequences. On this explanation, one looks at these events in terms of 
an evolving public policy response to an evolving problem: as mass disturbances and 
riots (public disorder) became more complex, so did the public policy response, in the 
shape of new public order offences. 
 In addition, the speeches of successive Home Secretaries clearly indicate a 
concern with public order. As David Blunkett put the matter when addressing the 
House of Commons in November 2001, ‘[t]his is a public order Act, and it is the order 
that we are talking about.’6 Or, consider the words of Charles Clarke during the 
second reading debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in June 2005.  
 
I [...] begin by emphasising that the Bill deals with hatred and incitement to 
hatred. It is about the nasty and extreme behaviour that drives people to hate 
others and sometimes, as the recent desecration of Jewish cemeteries shows, 
to turn that hatred against people and property. It is about behaviour that 
destroys individuals’ lives and sets one community against another. In 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on religious offences, the 
Association of Chief Police Officers said that hatred stirred up by extremist 
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groups contributed to the Bradford and Burnley riots in 2001. The Bill is 
intended to help tackle that sort of hatred − I emphasise “hatred”.7 
 
Of course, it might be countered that just because the Home Secretary referred to the 
public order nature of these offences it does not prove that the government definitely 
did not see these offences as also potentially being used to prevent the spread of 
extremist ideologies or acts of terrorism, for example. Indeed, the very concept of 
public order is not necessarily limited to mass disturbances and riots. I take the point. 
This bit of evidence is not conclusive. But the real issue is whether or not the 
evidence as a whole suggests that public order was the primary concern. The 
aforementioned evidence suggests that it was. 
The public order explanation is also borne out in some of the ensuing case law. 
One interesting case involved the stirring up of religious hatred by Sikhs against 
Muslims. In R. v. Singh, Singh Athwel, Singh, Baning, and Singh8 three of the 
defendants pleaded guilty to publishing material intended to stir up religious hatred 
against Muslims, contrary to section 29C of the Public Order Act 1986. This related to 
contributions they made to a Facebook page they had set up for the purposes of 
discussing the need to be mindful of atrocities committed by Muslims, to prevent 
sexually motivated attacks by Muslim men on Sikh women and generally to beware 
the threat posed by Muslims. In her sentencing remarks Judge Dean described the 
general ‘tone of the conversation’ on the Facebook page as ‘one of an immediate wish 
to use gratuitous violence against Muslims, effectively, for the simple reason that they 
are Muslims and Muslims were being regarded in the conversation as deserving of 
violence.’9 Judge Dean also made four references to ‘tensions’ between Sikh and 
Muslim communities in Leicester. At heart, this case was about a concern on the part 
of the police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Attorney General and Judge 
Dean about public order − a concern that the use of threatening words on Facebook 
could further heighten tensions between these ethno-religious groups and lead to 
violence and mass disturbances. Indeed, it is notable that the defendants were also 
convicted of various offences relating to the importing and possession of dangerous 
weapons including knives, knuckledusters, Tasers, pepper sprays, and batons, and to 
persuading people to travel to various locations around Leicester carrying these 
weapons. The two groups were gearing up for a mêlée on the streets of Leicester 
during which they and innocent members of the public could get hurt. That the court 
 8 
treated the problems being tackled by the offences as principally public order 
problems tells us something of the real function of the wider public policy on 
incitement to religious hatred. 
Despite all this, however, the public order explanation is not the dominant 
explanation in the literature. In fact, it hardly receives a mention next to the 
explanation which is dominant, to which I shall now turn. 
 
 
The sop explanation 
 
The dominant account of the real function of, or explanation for, the new stirring up 
religious offences runs as follows. In the 1960s the government set out to restrict 
immigration – as a response to concerns about the threat to social cohesion posed by 
excessive immigration – but to balance off the negative impact of these restrictions on 
existing immigrant families it also created the stirring up racial hatred offences, as a 
way of protecting these groups. Similarly, in the 2000s the government wished to 
introduction tough new anti-terrorism laws10 – to respond to concerns about the threat 
to security posed by Muslim extremism – but to offset the negative impact of these 
laws on the Muslim community it introduced new stirring up religious hatred offences 
(the existing stirring up racial hatred offences protected Jews and Sikhs as racial or 
ethnic groups but not Muslims as a religious group). This is the sop explanation: a 
strategy, or ploy, devised by the Labour government to take with one hand from 
British Muslims but to give back with another.11 (Of course, among the implicit 
factual premises built into the sop explanation is that anti-terrorism legislation was 
and is specifically targeted against the Muslim community, whether by design or 
effect; which is, of course, something governments may deny.) 
 One way of motivating the sop explanation is to consider the timing of the Labour 
government’s attempts to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences, first via 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001 and then again via the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004-5 and, finally, via the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Bill in 2005-6. It is no coincidence (the argument goes) that these bills were 
introduced in the wake of extremist Muslim terrorist atrocities, 9/11 and 7/7, and at 
times when the government was also introducing new anti-terrorism legislation in 
response to those atrocities. This timing at least seems to bear out the sop explanation. 
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If the Labour government had independent reasons to provide Muslims with new laws 
protecting them from the stirring up of religious hatred − reasons that had nothing to 
do with ameliorating the negative impact of anti-terrorism laws on the Muslim 
community − then one could have reasonably expected the Labour government to 
have been minded to provide these protections before its plans for anti-terrorism laws 
were developed. Yet prior to 9/11 the Labour Government had not clearly signalled 
any intention to introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences.12 The facts are 
that the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred offences did not make an 
appearance in the Queen’s Speech until 2004 (and then again in 2005),13 and did not 
figure in a Labour Party general election manifesto until 2005.14 This timing was 
certainly not lost on certain members of the House of Lords when it came to debating 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001. In the words of Lord 
Waddington, ‘[draft legislation on the stirring up of religious hatred] has precious 
little to do with the events of September 11th, except in the sense that after September 
11th it was offered to the Muslim community as a kind of sop to buy support for the 
war against terrorism.’15 
 Then again, not all the evidence stacks up for the sop explanation. In 2005, for 
example, Charles Clarke allegedly wrote to several mosques to explain that on the 5th 
of April, against the wishes of the Labour government, an amendment had been 
passed in the Lords that removed stirring up religious hatred offences from the 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill.16 Yet the letter makes no mention 
whatsoever of security and terrorism, anti-terrorism measures or the negative impact 
of such measures on the Muslim community. If the real function of the new offence 
had been to placate the Muslim community, perhaps the letter would have said 
something along these lines “We recognise the special role that the Muslim 
community is playing in tackling extreme Islamist ideology and terrorism, and that 
the burden of anti-terrorism measures have often fallen on Muslims, but we want to 
reassure you that we take the interests of the Muslim community extremely seriously, 
and so we are finally introducing new stirring up religious hatred offences.” 
 Of course, it might be argued that if the Labour government was attempting to 
soften the blow or in some sense compensate the Muslim community for anti-
terrorism measures − measures which the Muslim Council of Britain, for example, 
argued were targeted at the Muslim community − maybe the wise move would be not 
to make this explicit to Muslims. It might backfire on the government to admit that its 
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anti-terrorism measures are most likely curb and restrict the activities and freedoms of 
people from the Muslim community. Then again, if a group in society perceives that 
is facing burdens from anti-terrorism laws, and is alienated, disillusioned, and angry 
partly because of that perception, and one wishes to make amends, it might be a 
missed opportunity not to point out that introducing new stirring up religious hatred 
offences is designed to offer them something that improves their position. 
 There is another version of the sop explanation that is perhaps even weaker. It is 
that the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences in 2005 was 
supposed to be compensation for the fact that the Labour government had pursued the 
war in Iraq − a war that was waged in a country populated by Muslims and, therefore, 
a war that Muslims might view unfavourably either simply as causing the unnecessary 
deaths of Muslims or as a declaration of war against the entire Islamic Ummah. This 
version of the sop explanation, however, is severely undermined by the fact that the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was not the first attempt made by the Labour 
government to introduce the new offence. In the words of the then Labour MP (now 
Mayor of London) Sadiq Khan, during the second reading debate on the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Bill in the House of Commons in June 2005: 
 
The third objection is that this is a sop to the Muslim community, giving them 
preferential treatment because of the Iraq war. [But] the first time the then 
Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside 
(Mr. Blunkett) tried to introduce this legislation was in winter 2001 − more 
than a year before the war with Iraq − so I am afraid that the chronology of 
those who make that point is simply wrong. If British Muslims really were as 
powerful and influential as the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson) 
suggests, one would have thought that they could have persuaded the 
Government not to fight the Iraq war in the first place.17 
 
A more plausible argument, at least in terms of the sequence of events, might be to 
argue that the legislation was a sop to the Muslim community for the government’s 
failure to intervene to prevent the genocide and ethnic cleansing carried out against 
Bosniak citizens (Muslims) during the Bosnian war from 1992-1995. This, at least, 
predates the various attempts to legislate mentioned above. But here it is arguable that 
if the genocide was relevant to the creation of new stirring up religious hatred 
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offences, it was less likely to be because the new offences amounted to paying a debt 
to the Islamic Ummah and more likely to be because the government recognised 
patterns in history in which speech that stirs up ethnic or religious hatred ends in acts 
of genocide. In other words, the government could be interpreted as learning the 
lessons of the Bosnian genocide, along with the Rwandan genocide and, going further 
back, the Holocaust, about the sometimes devastating effects of incitement to hatred 
and the creation of a climate of hatred. I shall return to these ideas below. 
 In summary, it is arguable that the evidence which exists for the sop explanation 
is weak, and the counter evidence relatively strong. It is intriguing, therefore, that this 
has been the dominant explanation in the literature, even to the exclusion of other 
rival explanations. Perhaps one reason for this dominance might be the sort of 
literature involved. With the exception of Erik Bleich, the sop explanation has almost 
always popped up in articles and books written by legal scholars, as opposed to 
historians, political scientists and political theorists. A second, related reason may be 
that, within the relevant literature, the project of explaining why Britain introduced 
stirring up religious hatred offences tends to be of secondary, or minor importance, 
compared to the primary goal of critiquing the legislation. If an author is of the view 
that the legislation is bad legislation − perhaps because the author believes the law is 
badly drafted, unnecessary, ineffective, or has unjustified implications for freedom of 
expression − it is perhaps a convenient, similarly negative conclusion to draw that the 
motivations for the legislation were also compromised in some way. Among some 
social commentators, the sop explanation might also feed into a broader scepticism 
about ideas of multiculturalism and the New Labour project more generally. To 
embrace the sop explanation is to embrace the idea that attempting to recognise the 
special grievances of religious minorities, most notably Muslims, inevitably gets 
mired in difficult policy dilemmas and may cause the sacrifice of liberal freedoms; or 
belies a highly cynical strategy on the part of an electorally unsuccessful political 
party to assiduously accumulate a winning coalition of voters, whatever the cost. 
 
 
The anti-terrorism explanation 
 
A third explanation of the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred offences 
makes a direct appeal to matters of terrorism and national security. Whereas the sop 
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explanation plays up the fact that the new offences prohibit the stirring up of religious 
hatred against Muslims, the anti-terrorism explanation instead highlights the fact that 
the new offences prohibit the stirring up of religious hatred by Muslims. In short, the 
new offences were introduced in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 in an attempt to prevent 
radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists from engaging in incitement to 
hatred against Jews, Christians, and non-believers in general, of a sort that could 
ultimately lead to the spread of extremist Muslim ideology and terrorist atrocities. 
 According to the anti-terrorism explanation, it is no coincidence that the Labour 
government initially sought to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred offences 
via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 2001. In other words, its place in 
the Bill is not to be explained merely by the fact that adding new offences would be 
more efficiently achieved by adding the necessary amendments into an omnibus or 
bundle legislative bill − given that parliamentary time to pass new legislation is an 
incredibly scarce resource for any government − or by the fact that the Labour 
government anticipated that introducing the new offences would be controversial so it 
chose to hide the amendments in an high-profile bill and it just so happened to be an 
anti-terrorism bill. Rather, the introduction of the new stirring up religious hatred 
offences by means of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill reveals something 
about how the Labour government viewed the true purpose of the offences, the real 
problems the offences were intended to address. 
 If the real function of the new offences was to tackle threatening speech that stirs 
up religious hatred in ways that pose a threat to national security, this implies that the 
government believed this function was not being adequately fulfilled or could not be 
adequately fulfilled by the existing stirring up racial hatred offences. Given the value 
of parliamentary time as a scarce resource for implementing the government’s policy 
agenda, and assuming that senior civil servants in the Ministry of Justice, the Home 
Office and the CPS would have fully briefed both the Minister of State and the Home 
Secretary about the current state of incitement to hatred law, including successful and 
unsuccessful prosecutions under the law, then the current explanation only makes 
sense if the government had seen loopholes in the current offences as far as the 
protection of security is concerned. 
Here, at least, there is some evidence to support the explanation. The evidence 
comes directly from the case law. It is certainly true that the existing stirring up racial 
hatred offences had been put to use in the name of security, not merely from the 
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government’s perspective but also from the perspective of judges at the coal face. 
Consider R. v. El-Faisal.18 In this case police investigating possible al-Qaeda links in 
the UK found tape recordings of speeches given by the Jamaican-born Muslim cleric, 
Abdullah el-Faisal, labeled ‘No peace with the Jews’ and ‘Jewish Traits’. He was 
convicted inter alia of two counts of distributing threatening recordings with intent to 
stir up racial hatred − the first Muslim cleric to be convicted of such offences in 
England and Wales. For each of the two counts El-Faisal received a sentence of 
twelve months imprisonment. In his sentencing remarks Judge Beaumont seemed 
clear that the offence is taken extremely seriously due in large measure to the threat 
that the stirring up of racial hatred will lead impressionable people to take up arms. As 
he put it: 
 
In my judgment, your offending was aggravated by the fact that as a cleric 
you were sent to this country to preach and minister to the Muslim 
community in London, and so had a responsibility to the young and 
impressionable within that community at times of conflict abroad and 
understandable tensions in the communities here over the period which is 
spanned by the indictment. Instead of calming fears, you fanned the flames of 
hostility, and furthermore, as I have said already, your words were not 
confined to the study circles you addressed but recorded to be distributed to 
bookshops for sale to the public, packaged as they were in the tape covers 
which were exhibited in the course of this trial, and to me it rang hollow for 
you to say in evidence that none of the young men to whom you preached 
went off to fight in Afghanistan or Chechnya or Kashmir. No-one, least of all 
you, will ever know.19  
 
This is far from being an isolated case. Consider also R. v. Iftikhar Ali,20 R. v. 
Hamza,21 R. v. Rahman,22 R. v. Javed,23 R. v. Saleem24 − all of which involved 
successful prosecutions of either radical Muslim clerics or extremist Islamist activists 
for stirring up racial hatred offences − the last three of which concerned the Danish 
embassy demonstrations in February 2006 and all of which involved parallel 
convictions for terrorism related offences. More importantly, although there have 
been far fewer convictions under the new stirring up of religious hatred offences, 
these offences certainly have been used in some instances for the purpose of tackling 
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extremist Islamist ideology and potential seeds of terrorism. In R. v. Ahmad,25 for 
example, a dual nationality British-Pakastani business information technology 
graduate using the pseudonym Abu Jahiman engaged in an on-line discussion via the 
website IslamicAwakenings.com concerning a college in India that had allegedly 
banned its students from wearing the Burka. Mr. Ahmad wrote that ‘[Muslims] should 
storm these filthy rabid sub-monkeys and stomp on their jaws until they hear the 
sweet crack sound and then some.’ For this he was found guilty on one count of 
publishing written material with intent to stir up religious hatred and given a one year 
sentence. In his sentencing remarks Justice Royce was not explicit about members of 
which religious group were having hatred stirred up against them by Mr. Ahmad, but 
the facts of the case suggest members of the Hindu faith. Mr. Ahmad was also 
convicted for various other serious terrorist and criminal offences relating to the 
publication of extremist Islamist views on the Internet. The total sentence was 17 
years. In passing sentence Justice Royce used phrases such as ‘your views were 
corrosively dangerous’, ‘a significant risk to members of the public’, ‘public 
protection’, ‘a viper in our midst willing to get as many as possible to strike at the 
heart of Parliament and of our system’.26 Whilst many of these phrases were clearly 
aimed at the more serious offences, the judge does not explicitly exclude the stirring 
up religious hatred offences from the scope of these phrases, nor does the overall 
thrust of the sentencing remarks point toward that restriction of scope. What all of this 
shows is that there was indeed potentially a gap in the law which meant that prior to 
2006 a radical Muslim cleric or extremist Islamist activist could in theory stir up 
hatred against Hindus or Christians, say, without fear of prosecution, and in so doing 
pose a potential threat to national security. 
 Indeed, the anti-terrorism explanation might also draw strength from other similar 
measures taken by the Labour government, and continued by the Conservative 
government, to prevent radical Muslim clerics and extremist Islamist activists from 
peddling hatred in England and Wales, the justifications for which make explicit 
reference to terrorism and threats to national security. For example, Art. 320(6) of the 
Immigration Rules sets out the following grounds on which entry clearance or leave 
to enter the country can be refused: ‘where the Secretary of State has personally 
directed that the exclusion of a person from the UK is conducive to the public good.’ 
In August 2005, in the wake of the 7/7 London bombings, Charles Clarke set forth an 
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indicative list of ‘unacceptable behaviours’ to be used as bases for such exclusions, 
including the following: 
 
– Writing, producing or distributing material; 
– Public speaking including preaching 
– Running a website; or 
– Using a position of responsibility such as teacher, community or youth 
leader 
To express views which: 
– Format, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular 
beliefs; 
– Seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; 
– Foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious 
criminal acts or; 
– Foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.27 
 
The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, explicitly linked these new measures to ‘the 
terrorist threat in Britain’ and to ‘national security’.28 Interestingly, this list of 
‘unacceptable behaviours’ has been tested and upheld as lawful by the courts in 
subsequent cases. In Naik v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department,29 for 
example, the High Court of Justice (Admin.) upheld a decision taken in June 2010 by 
the then Home Secretary (and now Prime Minister), Theresa May, partly on the 
advice of the director general of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
(“OSCT”), Charles Farr, to exclude an Indian national and Muslim writer and orator 
from entering the UK. The letter stated that Dr. Naik was to be excluded ‘for 
engaging in unacceptable behaviour by making statements that attempt to justify 
terrorist activity and fostering hatred.’ The Court accepted that the exclusion order 
was ‘necessary for, and proportionate to, the legitimate aims of protecting national 
security, preventing crime and protecting the rights of others.’30 This decision was 
subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal (Civ.). Notably, the higher judgement 
contains 15 references to ‘national security’ but only 4 references to ‘public order’.31  
 Advocates of the anti-terrorism explanation might suggest that the real function of 
the public policy on incitement to religious hatred − although not the proximate cause 
of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 itself − has continued to reveal itself 
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over time as politicians have in their speeches, wittingly or unwittingly, combined 
discussion of anti-terrorism measures, such as the encouragement of terrorism and the 
glorification of terrorism offences, with discussion of the offences. One such example 
is a statement on national security issued by the office of the then Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown, in November 2007 which talks in the main about the threat of 
terrorism and various anti-terrorism measures, including tackling those who use the 
Internet for the purposes of the encouragement of terrorism, but also mentions in 
passing that ‘the Home Secretary is inviting the largest global technology and internet 
companies to work together to ensure that our best technical expertise is galvanised to 
counter online incitement to hatred.’32 The discursive linking together of the stirring 
up hatred offences with issues of terrorism and national security has to some extent 
continued with the Conservative government through its reinvention of the Prevent 
Strategy, a set of policy measures aimed at challenging the ideological roots of 
terrorism as much as tackling the threat of terrorist atrocities themselves. 
Interestingly, in her Foreword to the publication of the new Prevent Strategy 
document in June 2011, Theresa May stated boldly:  
 
The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. 
It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism.33 
 
Given this statement, it could seem indicative that, as well as discussing a range of 
anti-terrorism measures, this same Prevent Strategy document also throws into the 
mix the stirring up offences. ‘Powers derived from public order-related legislation, for 
example, can address activity which contributes to stirring up racial or religious 
hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.’34 The implication here (so 
defenders of the anti-terrorism explanation might argue) is that the Conservative 
government views the stirring up of hatred as part of government policy to prevent 
terrorism rather than policy to promote integration. 
 The anti-terrorism explanation faces some not insignificant problems, however. 
One problem concerns the idea that the Labour government’s attempt to introduce 
new stirring up religious hatred offences via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill in 2001 revealed something of the true purpose of those offences. One problem 
with this idea is that the Labour Government made no appeal to security issues during 
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the key House of Commons debates. Thus, in the second reading debate in the 
Commons the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, explained the rationale behind 
the new offence in terms of responding to requests from Muslim leaders and 
achieving parity of protection among Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians alike.35  
Now it is also true that in his comments Blunkett made the following additional 
argument.  
 
It has been suggested − I heard people say this as recently as this morning on 
the radio − that it might be used against Muslims. That is true; it might, 
because Muslims are no less subject to the law than Christians, Hindus, Jews 
or anyone else.36 
 
What this tells us about the underlying purpose of the legislation is open to 
interpretation, however. Conceivably Blunkett was making an implicit admission that 
the government really did intend the legislation as a way to help the police fight 
extremist Islamist ideology and terrorism. But this interpretation could also smack of 
historical revisionism. At the time several journalists, community leaders and to some 
extent the wider public were concerned that history could repeat itself in the sense that 
some of the early successful prosecutions under the Race Relations Act 1965 were 
against black people.37 Blunkett’s response was to grasp the nettle: to insist that if one 
does introduce laws banning the stirring up of religious hatred then it is only right that 
these laws are applied to everyone. Then again, those who favour the anti-terrorism 
explanation might simply say that Blunkett was using arguments about equity in the 
application of law simply as a smokescreen. Admitting that the new offences might 
also be used against Muslims was a way of preparing the public for the fact that the 
police would target their use of the laws particularly against extremist Islamist 
speakers, the real function of the laws. But this interpretation faces a dilemma. On the 
one hand, if the chief purpose was anti-terrorism and tackling extremist Islamist 
speakers, why did Blunkett not explicitly mention this intention at the time? On the 
other hand, if this was the chief purpose but nevertheless Blunkett took the view that 
it was more strategic not to reveal this purpose to the public, why say anything about 
Muslims at all? Why draw attention to a purpose that he wanted to remain hidden? 
 Now it is also true that during the House of Lords debate on the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Bill in October 2005 Lord Ahmed, a Labour member, declared, ‘My 
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Lords, the Bill is intended to give faith communities the levels of safety and security 
to which they are entitled in a diverse, civilised and democratic society.’38 However, 
there is reason to think that he meant ‘safety and security’ in the public order sense 
rather than in the security and terrorism sense. During the House of Lords debate on 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001, for example, Lord 
Ahmed had himself argued that the inclusion of the new offence within an anti-
terrorism law was not merely a red-hearing but could unwittingly create a pernicious 
association in the minds of people about terrorism and religion that ought to be 
avoided. In his words:  
 
The British Muslims are wary that they will be segregated from society 
because of their religious beliefs, especially in the light of recent world 
events. If we are to include religion under the same umbrella as terrorism, 
then it is inevitable that some people may consider certain religious beliefs to 
be a form of terrorism. We do not want to see that happen. While I strongly 
support religious discrimination laws, I propose that that should be a separate 
Bill. This is necessary to avoid any misunderstanding between the two issues 
and to emphasise that the Government are wholly supportive of the need to 
improve religious relations.39 
 
In a similar vein, Lord Dholakia suggested to his colleagues during the same debate 
that even the coincidental inclusion of new stirring up religious hatred offences with 
an anti-terrorism law could potentially undermine an important distinction. 
 
There is also concern about the security of all communities in Britain. The 
Government have rightly recognised that, but they have done so in the wrong 
context. Religious hatred, particularly when it is directed at minorities, has 
existed from the time when minorities set foot in this country. The events of 
11th September are not required to recognise that. We on these Benches find 
it difficult to accept that the Bill is the right place for such legislation. We are 
not alone in that − even the Commission for Racial Equality argues that a 
distinction can be made between anti-terrorism measures that can be justified 
as necessary in the current emergency situation and those that have wider 
implications and which should be given greater consideration in Parliament.40  
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Thus, not only did the Labour government make no appeal to terrorism and national 
security issues when attempting to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred 
offences in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 but also the House of Lords successfully 
removed the new offence from the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill at that 
time partly because several peers argued persuasively that the new offence clearly 
could not be appropriately considered an anti-terrorism measure. 
 A second problem has to do with the fact that around the time that the Labour 
government was finally able to introduce the new stirring up religious hatred offences 
through the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 it also introduced other offences 
the stated purpose of which was made explicit, to clamp down on so-called preachers 
of hate. Charles Clarke pushed through the Terrorism Bill in 2006, which, amongst 
other things, introduced new encouragement of terrorism and glorification of 
terrorism offences. The wider context was that the Labour government had been 
criticised over the failure of police to immediately arrest Muslim demonstrators who, 
in response to cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish 
newspaper, had, in February 2006, marched through London and stood in front of the 
Danish embassy wielding placards, amongst other things, praising the 7/7 bombings 
and calling for beheadings. Clarke was unequivocal about the point of introducing the 
new encouragement of terrorism and glorification of terrorism offences. 
 
The Government believes that the glorification of terror is an essential − I 
emphasise that word − method that is used by individuals and organisations 
that pursue terrorist ambitions and wish to get individuals such as the 
7/7 bombers to commit to their suicidal and destructive ends.41 
 
That the Labour government introduced in 2006 bespoke offences to deal directly 
with so-called preachers of hate casts doubt on an interpretation that says the stirring 
up religious offences, introduced around the same time, were also principally aimed at 
curbing the activities of extremist Islamist speakers. 
 A third problem is that if the government wanted to introduce new stirring up 
religious hatred offences under the banner of anti-terrorism, why did it choose to 
introduce the offences within the existing framework of public order legislation? Why 
not insert the offences into other, anti-terrorism legislation? After all, the courts, 
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whose job it is to implement the new offences, were always likely to take their lead 
from the fact that government was amending the Public Order Act 1986, a piece of 
public order legislation. Now it is certainly true that in some cases involving the new 
stirring up religious hatred offences courts have used the discourse of security and 
anti-terrorism in their sentencing remarks. But in other cases the courts have treated 
the problems being tackled by the offences as public order problems. Consider once 
again Singh. In her sentencing remarks Judge Dean gave no hint that the offences 
were being used to address issues of security and terrorism, as evidenced by the fact 
that the words ‘security’ and ‘terrorism’ simply do not figure in the sentencing 
remarks. In this case the stirring up religious hatred offences − public order offences 
in legal doctrine or classification − were being used to tackle a local ethno-religious 
public order problem. 
 A final problem relates to the anti-terrorism explanation not as an explanation of 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 as such but as an explanation of the 
ongoing point and purpose of the stirring up religious hatred offences in England and 
Wales. It has to do with the above-discussed combining, within the discourse of some 
politicians, of statements about anti-terrorism measures with statements about the 
stirring up of hatred, especially in relation to iterations of the Prevent Strategy. The 
anti-terrorism explanation takes this correlation at face value, as telling us something 
about the shared purpose of encouragement of terrorism and glorification of terrorism 
offences, on the one hand, and stirring up hatred offences, on the other. But this 
explanation belies the nuanced nature of the correlation. For example, speaking in 
November 2014 about the Conservative government’s anti-terrorism measures, 
Theresa May stated: 
 
Since I became Home Secretary, I have excluded hundreds of people in total 
from Britain. I have excluded 61 people on national security grounds and 72 
people because their presence here would not have been conducive to the 
public good. In total, I have excluded eighty-four hate preachers.42 
 
Perhaps insufficient care is taken here to make the point that some “hate preachers” 
were excluded on national security grounds whereas other “hate preachers” were 
excluded because their presence here would not have been conducive to the public 
good, such as if they posed a risk to public order, say. But nevertheless the fact that 
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these two grounds for exclusion are separated gives a strong indication that the real 
function, as well as the actual practice, of immigration rules allowing the Home 
Secretary to exclude people who stir up hatred, cannot be exclusively related to the 
prevention of terrorism. Put crudely, if 61 people were excluded on national security 
grounds but 84 “hate preachers” were excluded, it stands to reason that at least some 
“hate preachers” must have been excluded for reasons other than national security. 
 
 
The client politics explanation 
 
Yet another explanation appeals to the idea of client politics.43 Put crudely, a client 
politics approach to explaining the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred 
offences back in 2006 highlights the patterns of benefits and burdens faced by 
different groups in society as a predictor of changes in legislation serving or not 
serving the interests of those groups. Where the stirring up of religious hatred, and the 
burdens associated with the climates of hatred and fear to which this sort of speech 
contributes, is concentrated on a particular group, one can expect that group to be 
more likely to mobilise to request laws that offer some protection against this hate 
speech than is the case if the burdens are dispersed across society. On this 
explanation, the basic reason why we ended up with new stirring up religious hatred 
offences was the fact that Muslim groups were being disproportionately burdened by 
this sort of hate speech. Indeed, the client politics explanation is also consistent with 
the putative fact that the introduction of new stirring up religious hatred offences 
happened at a time when there was an increase in the stirring up of hatred against 
Muslims in the wake of after high-profile extremist Islamist terror attacks. 
 It can be pointed out, in support of this explanation, that although the new stirring 
up religious hatred offences would also provide protection to Christians, Hindus, and 
Buddhists, for instance, most of the debate in public life concentrated on Muslims. So, 
for example, as early as 2003 the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious 
Offences in England and Wales recognised that the government’s proposal to 
introduce new stirring up religious hatred offences via the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Bill in 2001 ‘proceeded from threats to the Muslim communities and their 
members, following the events of 11th September 2001 in New York, and other acts 
 22 
of terrorism elsewhere.’44  And, in the words of David Blunkett during the House of 
Commons debate on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in November 2001: 
 
We were approached by leaders of the Muslim community − it was a 
representative leadership group − who thought that it was only right, fair and 
protective to include religion with race in terms of avoiding incitement to hate 
using the Public Order Act 1986. I considered that and decided that their 
point was fair and reasonable.45 
 
Subsequently, in a speech to the Institute of Public Policy Research in July 2004 
Blunkett stated that ‘[i]f anything the arguments for this extension of the law have 
grown stronger since 2001’.46 He did not on that occasion pause to explain why the 
argument had ‘grown stronger’, but it may be plausible to read this statement as a 
response to civil society research being undertaken at the time on the rise of 
islamophobia since 2001. Take, for instance, a report by the independent Commission 
on British Muslims and Islamophobia in June 2004 setting out the impact of 9/11 and 
the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the experiences of British Muslims, 
including experiences of anti-Muslim hostility and its manifestation in verbal as well 
as physical attacks on Muslims in public places.47 
 A central claim of the client politics explanation is that if the burdens of the 
stirring up of religious hatred are disproportionately imposed on a particular group 
rather than being spread evenly across society, one can explain and would expect the 
affected groups to lobby governments to bring about legislation even at the expense of 
the interests of the general public. Putting this another way, even if the relevant 
incitement to hatred laws are not in the interests of the general public (e.g., speaker 
and audience interests in free public discourse on matters concerning religious 
believers as well as religious beliefs), minority religious groups would be acutely 
aware of the cost of other people enjoying the freedom to stir up hatred against them 
and so would be particularly motivated to persuade politicians to legislate. In that 
sense the real function of, and true explanation for, the new stirring up religious 
hatred offences was to serve the interests of Muslim clients and thereby to serve the 
interests of politicians standing for election in constituency containing these clients. 
 Two factual premises need to be substantiated, therefore. The first is that Muslims 
did lobby the government for a change in the law. This premise seems entirely 
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unproblematic. The evidence suggests, not least from the testimony of 
parliamentarians, that a many Muslim groups and leaders did assert that they were 
suffering from an increase in hate speech post 9/11 and 7/7 and did lobby their MPs 
and the government for new stirring up religious hatred offences as part of the 
solution. Of course, it is also the case that some Muslims argued against the 
introduction of the new offences precisely because they seemed to be another way of 
putting Muslims to the forefront of the public’s consciousness, and not in a good way. 
But this need not in itself undermine the client politics explanation. It is enough that 
some Muslim groups did mobilise in favour of the legislation because it represented a 
net benefit to them. 
The second premise is that this lobbying resulted from the facts on the ground. 
For the client politics explanation to work it must actually be the case that there was a 
disproportionate burden of incitement to hatred on a particular group (Muslims), as 
well as a concentrated benefit to be had from legal protection also for that group, with 
costs in freedom expression diffusely distributed across the general population. With 
regards to this premise, however, the main problem for the client politics explanation 
is a lack of tailored evidence. Official hate crime statistics, in the form released to the 
public, tend to be broken down by broad categories, including religion, but not 
disaggregated into particular religions. From time to time supplementary official 
reports are released which do provide this level of information. For example, in its 
2012 report Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: Learning From Casework, the CPS stated that 
‘[t]he majority of the religiously aggravated hate crime cases sampled (62%) involved 
an element of anti-Muslim sentiment’.48 Similarly, in its 2013 report An Overview of 
Hate Crime in England and Wales the Home Office, Office for National Statistics and 
Ministry of Justice stated that ‘the 2011/12 and 2012/13 ‘[the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales] showed that Muslim adults were the most likely to be a victim of 
religiously motivated hate crime’49 So in theory one could postulate for the purposes 
of the explanation that these figures would not have changed significantly from 
around 2005-6. Nevertheless, although these statistics are broken down by broad 
category of offence, such as public order offences, they are not broken down by 
specific type of offence, such as a particular public order offence. This means that 
even hate crime statistics on religiously motivated public order hate crimes will 
typically include public order hate crimes that are not essentially speech-based, public 
order hate crimes that are speech-based but are not the stirring up offences, and, 
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finally, the stirring up hatred offences.50 So it is quite possible that both hate crime 
statistics and the experiences of those Muslims who lobbied the government were 
based on a blurring of different kinds of incidents involving islamophobic hate 
speech. It is quite possible that what Muslims were actually experiencing was an 
increase in the incidence of the religiously motivated public order offence of 
intentional harassment, alarm or distress − for example, person A, who is non-
Muslim, uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or displays a sign 
that is threatening, abusive or insulting, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress and thereby caused harassment, alarm or distress to person B who was 
Muslim or perceived to be Muslim, aggravated by religious hostility.51 But not 
necessarily an increase in the incidence of the stirring up of religious hatred − for 
example, person A, who is non-Muslim, uses threatening words or behaviour with the 
intention of stirring up hatred against Muslims, perhaps to an audience of fellow non-
Muslims. Of course, none of this proves that Muslims did not suffer a burden of 
increased incidence of the stirring up of religious hatred against them post 9/11 and 
7/7. But nevertheless the client politics explanation runs hollow if the disproportionate 
burden premise cannot be substantiated with evidence.  
Now it might be pointed out at this stage that non-governmental organisations are 
also a source of tailored information about hate crimes. Tell MAMA, for example, 
provides self-identifying victims or witnesses of hate crimes and incidents an 
opportunity to self-report their experiences, and provides annual data on self-reports 
of anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. In 2014 academic researchers from the 
Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside University 
conducted a study of the methods and findings of Tell MAMA and found that 
‘[w]ithstanding the necessary caveats of self-reported data […] − now minimised as 
far as possible by the tightening of data collection processes – the data collected by 
Tell MAMA is reliable.’52 Both in the Tell MAMA annual reports investigated by 
Teesside University, and in Tell MAMA’s subsequent annual reports, the organisation 
identifies a clear correlation in the data: namely, spikes in the rate of self-reports of 
anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents after high profile public events involving 
Islamistist extremism, such as after the killing of Lee Rigby, the Charlie Hebdo attack 
in Paris, the story of three Muslim schoolgirls leaving Britain to join ISIS, the attack 
in the tourist resort in Tunisia, and the November 2015 Paris attacks.53 Once again, 
perhaps one could postulate that spikes that are in evidence now would have also 
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occurred back in 2001 after 9/11 and in 2005 after the 7/7 London bombings. 
However, there remains a difficulty with the Tell MAMA data coding, at least as far 
as the client politics explanation is concerned. Tell MAMA caseworkers sub-divide 
self-reported anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents as follows: for online incidents, 
the categories are ‘abuse’, ‘anti-Muslim literature’ and ‘threat’; for offline incidents, 
they are ‘property damage’, ‘assault’, ‘threat’, ‘extreme violence’ and ‘anti-Muslim 
literature’.54 But it cannot just be assumed that reports coded as ‘threat’ and ‘anti-
Muslim literature’ together amount to the use of threatening words or behaviour with 
the intention of stirring up of hatred against Muslims. Even if this is an imperfect, but 
workable proxy, there is also the problem of comparing this data, which focuses 
exclusively on Muslims, with the situation faced by other religious groups. If there is 
no comparable data on the extent of incitement to hatred against, say, Jews, Sikhs, 
Hindus, for example, or indeed, against the LGBT community or people with 
disabilities, the premise that Muslims were disproportionately burdened by incitement 
to hatred cannot vindicated. Then, of course, there is the problem that the data does 
not extend back to 2001 and 2005. 
 It might be tempting at this stage, therefore, to see if the case law can provide 
falsifying or corroborating evidence for the client politics explanation. But once again 
this evidence is inconclusive. If Muslims really were being disproportionately 
burdened by the stirring up of hatred, then, other things remaining equal, one might 
have expected to see a slew of convictions for people stirring up religious hatred 
against Muslims once the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 came into force. But 
this did not happen. This author knows of only one such example, Singh. Compare the 
situation with the steady stream of convictions for the stirring up of racial hatred 
against Jews, for example. I have already mentioned R. v. Iftikhar Ali, R. v. Hamza, R. 
v. Rahman, R. v. Javed, and R. v. Saleem. To this list one can also add R. v. 
Birdwood,55 R. v. Atkinson, Piggins, Hill, Bostock, and Denis,56 R. v. Sheppard and 
Whittle,57 R. v. Heaton and Hannington,58 and R. v. Bonehill-Paine.59 On the other 
hand, it is clear that other things are not equal, meaning that other factors might 
explain the disparity. One is the willingness of members of different religious 
communities to report cases to the police. Another, more important factor is that the 
basic elements of the stirring up religious hatred offences are importantly different to 
the stirring up racial hatred offences. When it comes to the former offences, the 
legislation includes the intention clause, the threatening language clause, and the 
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Freedom of Expression clause − all of which have set the bar for successful 
prosecution so high that very few cases can pass muster. But when it comes to the 
latter offences, the test is intention or likelihood, threatening, abusive or insulting 
language, and no freedom of expression clause − all of which makes for a greater 
number of prosecutable cases, albeit still relatively few compared to other public 
order offences.60 It is also relevant here that the Freedom of Expression clause61 was 
introduced by the Lords, not by the government. The government took that view that 
the legislation offered adequate protections of free speech already, and so the clause 
was redundant. But the government did not succeed in overturning the Lords 
amendment in the commons. In short, the will of the government and the will of the 
Houses of Parliament pointed in different directions and the government did not get 
its way.62 All of these mitigating factors working together could mean that the client 
politics explanation is not undermined by the low conviction rates, after all. 
 Since the hate crime statistics and the case law neither establishes nor discredits 
the premise that Muslims were disproportionately burdened with incitement to hatred, 
however, it does remain a possibility that at the time Muslims were merely one group 
among many others who experienced a similar burden from incitement to hatred. In 
fact, some other relevant evidence points to exactly this situation. If the burden of 
incitement to hatred was actually diffusely distributed among numerous minority 
groups, then this suggest that numerous, well-organised interest groups would be 
motivated to persuade the government to adopt a much broader strategy on tackling 
the stirring up of hatred, such as by enacting legislation that banned the stirring up of 
hatred on the basis of a long list of protected characteristics. This is precisely what 
happened. At the time of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005, some gay rights 
campaigners were also calling on government to extend the stirring up hatred offences 
to include sexual orientation as well as religion. Some Liberal Democrat MPs were 
making similar suggestions in the 2005 General Election. This public influence was 
also clearly reflected in the parliamentary exchanges on the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Bill, where sexual orientation was also discussed and the case made for its 
inclusion.63 Likewise, only a year after the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, the 
leading gay rights interest group, Stonewall, presented its argument for new offences 
covering sexual orientation during the Committee Stage of Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Bill in 2007.64 (In fact, there are signs that this is now starting to happen 
with disability. Consider the recent electronic petition calling on the government to 
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extend the stirring up hatred offences to cover disability.65) That Muslims were not 
alone in pushing for protection contradicts the client politics explanation. Instead, it 
points toward something like an umbrella of interest groups explanation.66 
 
 
The parity of protection explanation 
 
This final explanation of the government’s introduction of the stirring up religious 
hatred offences builds on the client politics narrative about Muslims being in an 
especially difficult situation, but redirects that narrative towards the more basic point 
that Jews and Sikhs did, but Muslims did not, enjoy protect against the stirring up of 
racial hatred under the Public Order Act 1986, due to the way courts in England and 
Wales interpreted the meaning of the words ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. According to this 
explanation, the real function of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was simply 
to achieve parity of protection for similar groups, quite apart from whether or not 
Muslims were in fact disproportionately burdened by incitement to hatred. 
 According to the parity of protection explanation, the key turning point for an 
eventual change in the law can also be traced back to 1998 when the Runnymede 
Trust launched its Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (funded by the 
Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust). Following the landslide victory of the Labour 
Party in the 1997 general election, the new Home Secretary and MP for Blackburn 
(another northern British town with a significant South Asian population and one of 
the highest proportions of Muslims in the country), Jack Straw, attended the launch 
event on behalf of the government. In October 2000, the Commission, now chaired by 
the scholar of British identity and multiculturalism, Bhikhu Parekh, published its 
report. At the time The Telegraph published a series of critical responses to the 
Parekh Report, falsely accusing it of declaring the term “British” a ‘racist’ term. Jack 
Straw sought to partially distance the Labour government from what was being 
portrayed in the media as the extreme multiculturalist ideology of the Parekh Report. 
Nevertheless, in the Report the Commission briefly touched on the problem of 
incitement to hatred. It made two crucial points: first, that the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) itself provided a broad framework for a new settlement 
between the diverse racial, ethnic and religious communities of Britain, including a 
balance between ‘the right to free speech and the right to freedom from incitement to 
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racial hatred’;67 second, that Jews in Britain had benefited from the strengthening of 
countervailing forces against anti-Semitism, including laws banning the stirring up of 
hatred on grounds of race, ethnicity and national origin, but also that ‘[i]t would be 
perverse […] not to acknowledge that, however deeply wounding and painful 
expressions of antisemitism are in Britain today, the racism experienced by Asian, 
black, Gypsy and Irish communities demands primary attention.’68 The Parekh Report 
was a high water mark of a type of public intellectual work on multiculturalism which 
enjoyed the ear of the Labour government. On the issue of stirring up religious hatred, 
its ideas echoed recommendations that had also been made back in 1992 by the 
Commission for Racial Equality in its Second Review of the Race Relations Act 1976: 
namely, that the government should introduce new stirring up religious hatred 
offences.69 The Commission for Racial Equality’s Review spoke of the doubly 
‘anomalous’ situation that whilst Jews and Sikhs (in the wake of Mandla v. Dowell-
Lee70) but not Muslims enjoyed protection against the stirring up of racial hatred in 
England and Wales, in Northern Ireland the law covered race and religion, and so 
Jews, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and Hindus alike.71 Together these commissions 
seemed to have cleared a pathway for a change in the law, removing obstacles that 
had been laid down by Dingle Mackintosh Foot back in 1965. They addressing 
concerns over free speech and they motivated the necessity of the legislation to 
address lack of parity. 
Evidence for the parity of protection explanation is also not hard to find in the 
relevant parliamentary debates of 2005. Consider the words of Charles Clarke during 
the second reading debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill in the House of 
Commons in June 2005. 
 
The Bill seeks to address the anomaly that means that Jews and Sikhs are 
protected under the existing law, but that other faith groups, and people of no 
faith, are not protected. I think that that is simply not right and that the 
problem needs to be addressed.72  
 
It is also appropriate to consider some of the arguments made in the House of Lords, 
who in the end would not oppose the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill once the 
Freedom of Expression clause had been added. During a House of Lords debate in 
October 2005, for example, several Lords defended the Bill on grounds of parity. 
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Lord Ahmed said: ‘Put simply, it is about preventing people inciting hatred and 
providing all communities with equal protection.’73 Or, as Baroness Ramsay put it, 
the provision will ‘remove the anomaly whereby mono-ethnic faith groups such as 
Sikhs and Jews are protected under the incitement to racial hatred provision, whereas 
multi-ethnic groups, such as Muslims and Christians, are not.’74 Lord Avebury then 
offered up the following example of the anomaly at work in English courts.  
 
A cleric who urged followers to kill non-believers, Americans, Hindus and 
Jews was jailed, first, for seven years for incitement to commit murder, and 
then an extra two years were added for incitement to racial hatred. If he had 
chosen his words more carefully and excluded Jews from this incitement, he 
would have been given only seven years and not nine.75 
 
Although Lord Avebury did not specify, it is highly likely from his description of the 
case and the sentence handed down that he was referring to El-Faisal. 
 Another potential advantage of the parity of protection explanation is that it can 
point to a coherent strategy pursued by the government in dealing with issues of 
religion and hatred. After all, the Labour government back in 2001, via the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (s. 39), successfully amended existing hate 
crime legislation (the Crime and Disorder Act 1998), so as to include sentence-
enhancement provisions for offences that are racially or religiously aggravated. This 
was an omnibus act which included both hate crime and anti-terrorism measures. But 
the legislative intention was, arguably, transparent: namely, to achieve parity of 
protection for victims of hate crime. The aim of removing the anomaly of unequal 
protection against hate crimes across all faith communities in England and Wales 
could be seen in the arguments put forth by various Lords during debates.76 
Significantly, this policy also had a bearing on instances of hate speech covered by 
public order offences other than the stirring up of racial hatred offence. Consider 
cases of religiously aggravated harassment, alarm or distress,77 such as Norwood v. 
DPP,78 in which the defendant displayed a poster that read ‘Muslims out of Britain’. 
 The parity of protection explanation might also be used to explain further 
extensions of the stirring up hatred family of offences to other groups. In 2007, for 
example, during the second reading debate on the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Bill, Chris Bryant declared that it was high time to introduce an offence of stirring up 
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hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in order to ‘overcome anomalies’ in the 
relevant laws.79 Likewise, in 2011 the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
defended the creation of a new offence of stirring up hatred on grounds of disability 
for the sake of ‘parity’.80 More recently, a significant number of the individuals and 
stakeholder organisations who took part in the Law Commission’s consultation 
exercise allied to its report, Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended?, 
argued on the basis of parity for the creation of new stirring up hatred offences for 
both disability and transgender identity.81 The Commission itself ultimately did not 
recommend this extension for mainly practical reasons (they took the view that there 
was insufficient evidence that the kind of conduct that would be caught by the act is 
actually occurring). However, in 2015 the House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee also heard evidence from a number of expert witnesses on the need for 
parity of protection for people with transgender identities given facts on the ground.82 
Pace the Law Commission, the Women and Equalities Committee recommended that 
‘[t]he Government should introduce new hate crime legislation which extends the 
existing provisions on [...] stirring up hatred so that they apply to all protected 
characteristics, as defined for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.’83 
 Nevertheless, I must also address four potential problems even with the parity of 
protection explanation. One problem is that by itself the explanation may struggle to 
explain why politicians and peers accepted the introduction of the new stirring up 
religious hatred offences as the appropriate response to anomalies in the protection of 
groups. The parity of protection explanation highlights the fact that courts in England 
and Wales have on occasions convicted radical Muslim clerics or extremist Islamist 
activists for inciting racial hatred against Jews − for example, Iftikhar Ali and El-
Faisal − but at the same time the courts have not regarded Muslims as belonging to a 
racial, ethnic or national group for the purposes of interpreting the stirring up racial 
hatred offence − a view consistent with a leading case in the field of anti-
discrimination law, Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd.84 And so, in 2005 a rabbi could not be 
convicted for stirring up racial hatred against Muslims. Yet, it would have been 
perfectly consistent with the principle of parity of protection to remove the protections 
offered to Jews and Sikhs by repealing s. 3 of the Public Order Act 1986, say, as 
opposed to retaining those protections and extending them to Muslims via s. 3A.85  
A second problem is that even if the parity of protection explanation can account 
for the introduction of new stirring up hatred offences covering religion and sexual 
 31 
orientation, it does not at the present time seem to be a basis for making safe bets 
about the introduction of yet further offences covering transgender identity and 
disability, still less age or physical appearance. For example, in July 2016 the 
government published its long awaited plan for addressing the problem of hate crime, 
Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s Plan for Tackling Hate Crime. In 
response to recommendations from disability rights groups, academics including 
myself, and the Women and Equalities Select Committee, that the existing stirring up 
hatred offences should be extended to cover transgender identity and disability, the 
government’s new plan of action is to take no action. That is, ‘[g]overnment will 
consider these [recommendations].’86 In fact, the government had already been 
considering these recommendations (or kicking them into the long grass) since the 
Law Commission recommended against extending the stirring up hatred offences 
back in 2014.87 Not merely the Conservative government but parliament as a whole 
seems ambivalent at best about the extension project. At first blush, this might seem 
difficult to square with the idea that what tends to drive the introduction of new 
stirring up hatred offences is a concern with parity of protection.  
A third problem is that at least in 2005 the government had permitted other 
anomalies in the area of free speech and religion to continue − not least blasphemy 
laws protecting Christians but not Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, or Hindus, for example. So 
if the government’s core motivation when dealing with these policy issues really was 
to provide parity, then why did it allow uneven protection on this other matter?88 
Finally, the parity of protection explanation cannot explain why the stirring up 
racial hatred offence was introduced in the first place. 
 No doubt it is easier to reply to some of these problems than to others. The point 
about blasphemy laws, for example, is straightforwardly undercut by the fact that the 
Labour government fairly swiftly moved to also abolish common-law offences of 
blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales via the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008. The other problems are trickier.  
Nevertheless, the problem about the anomaly being resolved through repeal rather 
than extension might be countered by saying that although the real driving force is a 
concern for parity of protection, that principle itself is likely to be embedded in a 
deeper principle of good administration, whereby governments seek higher-order 
consistency in the enactment of criminal law, that is, the principle of treating like 
reasons alike (and unalike reasons unalike). For example, one possible reason for 
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banning incitement to racial hatred is that certain kinds of racist hate speech can 
contribute to climates of hatred and fear. Applying this same rationale to the case of 
Muslims could justify the course of action of extending hate speech law to cover 
religion, based on a parallel concern that stirring up hatred against Muslims can 
contribute to climates of hatred and fear, rather than the course of action of repealing 
law.89 Alternatively, it might be that concern for parity of protection is actually 
derivative of a commitment to a more fundamental principle of showing equal respect 
for the ethnic and cultural identities of all human beings.90 This would certainly chime 
with other aspects of the multiculturalist vision set out in the Parekh Report 2000, 
assuming that the Report either echoed or influenced the Labour government’s 
thinking. 
The point about the Conservative government’s failure to extend the stirring up 
offences still further in the name of parity can also be countered as follows. Just 
because history tells us that when extensions of the stirring up hatred offences have 
occurred they have probably been driven by parity of protection; it does not mean that 
whenever parity of protection considerations are in play, then inevitably new 
extensions occur. Legislative change does not work like that. There are innumerable 
forces blocking the introduction of new legislation at any given time. The government 
is focused on Brexit at present; and it is considering a new British Bill of Rights. The 
latter especially would need to be dealt with as part of considering any further limits 
on free speech. This is in addition to the government’s contention that there is 
insufficient evidence of a serious problem of incitement to hatred on grounds of 
transgender identity or disability. So the parity of protection explanation cannot be 
expected to forecast future extensions even if it can explain past extensions. Or, if the 
explanation can make forecasts, maybe these need to be framed in the longer term, 
thus controlling for other variables.  
Or perhaps the parity of protection explanation needs to be combined with other 
explanations in order to explain why future extensions have not occurred. In any 
event, it will need to be augmented with other explanations in order to explain why 
the stirring up racial hatred offences were introduced in the first place. 
Following on from this, it seems to me that surely the correct response to these 
problems, and the best approach full stop, is to explain the real function, and true 




A pluralistic explanation 
 
A pluralistic explanation of the rise and purpose of the stirring up religious hatred 
offences proceeds on the basis that there is nothing inconsistent in explaining the 
original creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences in one way, explaining the 
stirring up religious hatred offences in a different, more complex way, and explaining 
the failure of government to introduce yet more stirring up hatred offences in another 
way again. 
 The pluralistic explanation might run thusly. First, a significant part of the 
impetus for the creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences was ethnic tensions 
and race riots following a period increased immigration (the public order 
explanation).  
Second, the Labour government introduced the stirring up religious hatred 
offences partly because it had concerns about public order in the wake of increasingly 
complex racial, ethnic and religious mass disturbances and riots (the public order 
explanation). Another part had to do with how Muslims, in particular, had mobilised 
as lobbyists, not necessarily because they were disproportionately burdened by hate 
speech, but instead because of an acute awareness that they did not enjoy the same 
legal protections as other groups (the client politics explanation combined with the 
parity of protection explanation). In other words, the relevant burden partly consisted 
in the fact that Muslims were being treated, and believed that they were being treated, 
as second-class citizens by the law. Consider, once again, the letter that was allegedly 
sent by the office of Charles Clarke to several mosques in 2005. The letter includes 
the statement, ‘[w]e cannot see why it is right to have protection in law for Jews and 
Sikhs, but wrong to extend it to other communities like the Muslim community.’ This 
foreshadows what Charles Clarke said in parliament on the matter. But it is also 
important to understand that the letter was on Labour Party headed paper, around 
election time, explicitly laying blame at the door of members of the Liberal 
Democrats Party and the Conservative Party for the removal of the stirring up 
religious hatred offences from Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill. So in that 
sense the letter − assuming it did exist, and was in fact sent to mosques − was making 
an appeal to Muslim clients. But the crucial point here is that the burden it 
acknowledged was not an increase in anti-Muslim hate speech post 9/11 but instead 
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an appreciation that Muslims were being treated differently than Jews and Sikhs when 
it came to legal protections against the stirring up of hatred (the client politics 
explanation combined with the parity of protection explanation). 
Third, when questions emerge about why other stirring up hatred offences have 
yet to be introduced, such as for transgender identity and disability, these questions 
require complex answers. It is may be true that currently the burden of incitement to 
hatred is diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, and this has created 
a number of interest groups seeking further extensions of the stirring up hatred 
offences (the umbrella of interest groups explanation). And it may also be true that the 
government is inclined to want to undo anomalies in the cover provided by the 
existing offences (the parity of protection explanation). However, actual mass 
disturbances and riots in England and Wales have not evolved, yet, to include 
dimensions relating to transgender identity and disability (the public order 
explanation), and various other factors relating to Brexit mean that the government’s 





I have argued that the best explanation not merely of why we ended up with the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 but also the ongoing point and purpose of the 
stirring up hatred offences is likely to be pluralistic, and that our understanding is 
hindered rather than helped by the terrorisation of these offences, so to speak. In this 
section I want to briefly explore the implications of this conclusion for normative 
debates about hate speech laws and freedom of expression going forward. 
 The main point I want to make is that it matters what types of normative 
arguments academics and others are presenting to governments about why they 
should retain the stirring up hatred offences or even extend them further. The wrong 
types of arguments are those which are in tension with the best explanations of 
governmental intentions in this field of policymaking, potentially making them 
doomed to failure. Of course, one possible response to the tension is simply to deny 
that it matters: the right arguments are the right arguments and so it is up to those 
people who believe that the stirring up hatred offences should be extended, say, to 
convince governments to embrace their way of thinking. A second response, to which 
 35 
I more sympathetic, is that legal and political theorists, if they want to change the 
world, have every reason, when presenting normative arguments to governments, to 
present whichever, already good arguments best match the government’s way of 
thinking. 
So what normative arguments could potentially play well with the Conservative 
government on the issue of extending the stirring up hatred offences to include 
transgender identity and disability? Predictably, one potential argument would 
emphasise people’s right to parity of protection. Put simply, if two similar groups of 
people are subject to similar forms of incitement to hatred, but one of the groups 
enjoys legal protections against such speech whereas the other group does not, then 
the other group has a prima facie right to similar protection also.91 As Alon Harel puts 
it, ‘treating the victims of racist speech more favorably than victims of sexist, 
homophobic, or other forms of abhorrent speech is itself a form of discrimination.’92 
Another potentially important argument combines the right to parity of protection 
with an argument based on the public assurance of civic dignity. According to Jeremy 
Waldron, certain sorts of group libel and incitement to hatred laws could be warranted 
if they help to protect people’s sense that they are members of society in good 
standing, the sort of assurance that can be undone when they are confronted by public 
hate speech which downgrades or denigrates them.93 It strikes me that the threat to 
assurance could be especially high where certain groups realise that they lack the 
legal protections against incitement to hatred that other groups enjoy. If people with 
transgender identities or disabilities, for example, see that they lack the legal 
protections that various faith communities and gays and lesbians have benefited from, 
then this may compound the harmful effects of the incitement to hatred they endure. 
Both the incitement to hatred and the failure of parliament to act against it could leave 
people with transgender identities or disabilities feeling that they are second-class 
citizens. In other words, lack of parity of protection could be particularly devastating 
for their sense of assurance that they are members of society in good standing.94 
However, anyone who wants to persuade the government to extend the stirring up 
hatred offences must also clear away barriers that the government currently 
recognises, as previous governments have recognised, for not extending these 
offences. First among these barriers is freedom of expression. Examples of laws 
banning incitement to hatred can be found not just in England and Wales but also in 
domestic penal codes and various other legal instruments in countries across the 
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globe.95 Yet these laws continue to be subject to fierce criticism, especially, although 
not exclusively, among US scholars who defend freedom of expression based on 
values of autonomy, democracy and legitimate government.96 (Note, laws banning 
incitement to hatred cannot be found at either the federal or state levels in the US due 
to the way in which courts have interpreted the First Amendment over the past half 
century.) When the Labour government introduced the Racial and Religious Hatred 
Bill in 2005, several legal scholars raised objections, based on what they viewed as 
inherent differences between race and religion which made the former but not the 
latter worth of protection under incitement to hatred legislation, and on their 
perception that the latter posed a special threat to freedom of expression.97 Others, 
myself included, tried to make the counter case for the extension.98 Nevertheless, 
what nearly all sides in this debate agree about is that if a plausible case is going to be 
made for extending incitement to hatred laws still further, then only the strongest, 
principled arguments will do; anything less would be easily defeated by principled 
arguments on the side of free speech. 
But what are the strongest arguments? More importantly, are any of the strongest 
arguments likely to chime with the best explanations of why governments have in the 
past extended the stirring up hatred offences and why the Conservative government 
might do so in the future? One potential argument is that laws banning the stirring up 
of hatred on grounds of transgender identity or disability can be warranted insofar as 
the stirring up of hatred against these groups contributes to a climate of hatred in 
which hate crimes are more likely, and to a climate of fear, in which individual 
members of these groups suffer debilitating fear that they could become the victims of 
hate crime.99 This sort of argument might chime with the umbrella of interest groups 
explanation. In the event that the burden of incitement to hatred is diffusely 
distributed among numerous minority groups, including people with transgender 
identities or disabilities, this could create a number of interest groups seeking further 
extensions of the stirring up hatred offences. The present argument speaks to the sort 
of burdens faced by members of these minority groups. It could also be useful to the 
relevant interest groups in putting their case to government; provided, that is, 
evidence can be found that substantiates the arguments linking incitement to hatred 
with climates of hatred and fear and linking those climates with hate crimes, say. 
I also do not think that arguments which speak to public order, and therefore, 
march in step with the public order explanation, are out of the question. No doubt 
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defenders of the status quo could react by saying that our society has experienced 
religious wars and race riots, but not violent public explosions of simmering tensions 
between cisgender and transgender people, and not rioting by people with disabilities. 
In other words, it may be that mass disturbances and riots in England and Wales have 
yet to evolve to include the dimensions of transgender identity and disability, along 
with the dimensions of race, ethnicity and religion. However, arguably this was also 
not the case with sexual orientation. Yet the government did not wait for mass 
disturbances to occur involving violence between religious conservatives and 
homosexuals, say, before extending the legislation to cover sexual orientation. The 
risk was enough. This is also borne out in the case law. In R. v. Ali, Javed, and 
Ahmed,100 for example, three Muslim men became the first people to be successfully 
prosecuted for offences relating to the stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation in England and Wales. Acting together the men distributed leaflets on the 
streets of Derby titled ‘Turn or Burn’, ‘GAY – God Abhors You’, ‘Death Penalty?’ as 
a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that day. In his sentencing remarks 
Judge Burgess used the language of public order: ‘the vast majority of us get along 
together very well’, ‘the greatest freedom that we all enjoy is to live in peace and 
without fear’, ‘It was clearly perceived by parliament that people of a particular 
sexual orientation needed protection from that minority who wished to stir up hatred 
against them’, ‘your intention was to do great harm in a peaceful community’.101 
According to a more subtle version of the public order explanation, therefore, the 
government will, under the right circumstances, introduce laws banning the stirring up 
of hatred in response to the risk of mass disturbances and riots that have taken on 
more complex dimensions. So one potentially impactful line of normative argument 
might be that the stirring up of hatred against people with transgender identities or 
disabilities has the potential to become tomorrow’s Bradford riots, in any parts of the 
country with significant proportions of such people, and taking a precautionary 
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